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ARTICLES
Beyond Recidivism
DOUGLAS G. BAIRDt & ROBERT K. RASMUSSENt-
INTRODUCTION
Lynn LoPucki has done path-breaking work that has
enormously advanced our understanding of large Chapter
11 cases.1 Several years ago, Lynn LoPucki made a major
and previously unnoticed discovery about large Chapter 11
cases in the early 1990s. Those filed in Delaware returned
to bankruptcy at an extraordinarily high rate-almost ten
t Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of
Chicago. I am grateful to the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Russell Baker
Scholars Fund for research support.
tt Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. While he has done much of the work on his own, LoPucki has also been
able to work with other extraordinarily capable scholars. See, e.g., Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993); Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669
(1993); Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are
Delaware and New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1933 (2002). Moreover, LoPucki has been completely open in sharing his data
and helping others, even when their own views differ dramatically from his
own. We count ourselves among the many beneficiaries of his generosity.
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times the rate elsewhere. 2 This difference is exceedingly
unlikely to have arisen by chance. There is something
special about Delaware during this period, yet there is no
obvious difference in the size or the complexity of the cases
filed there. 3 The phenomenon calls out for an explanation,
and LoPucki deserves much more credit than he has
received for this startling finding. In his most recent work,
LoPucki has pushed the debate still further. He argues that
the high recidivism rate in Delaware has spread to other
jurisdictions and is symptomatic of a destructive race to the
bottom.4
The race, according to LoPucki, is being run by
bankruptcy judges. Most bankruptcy judges see only small
Chapter 11 cases. 5 The debtor is an electrical subcontractor,
a mom-and-pop restaurant, or a travel agency. These cases
do not make headlines and are not very interesting. By
contrast, in a mega-case, the bankruptcy judge controls the
fate of thousands of workers and hundreds of millions of
dollars. Bankruptcy judges live to preside over these cases,
and most never do. In the early 1990s, the bankruptcy court
in Delaware developed a set of practices that made it
attractive to case placers, those who decided where to file.
Suddenly, the big cases started being filed in Delaware.
Bankruptcy judges elsewhere took note and mimicked them
in an effort to attract large cases to their own courts.
Some of the practices that attract big cases are
beneficial. Judges become less imperious, more responsive,
and more predictable. But competition also leads to judicial
practices-from promiscuous critical vendor orders to overly
2. More precisely, LoPucki focuses on cases where a company emerged from
Chapter 11 between the start of 1991 and the end of 1996. Here (and elsewhere
in the paper) the comparisons are between Delaware and the rest of the country
excluding the Southern District of New York. The refiling rate was higher in the
Southern District than the rest of the country, but again, not as high as
Delaware.
3. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a 'Race to the
Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001); LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1.
4. LYNN M. LoPucKi, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).
5. See Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking: An Empirical
Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. & ECON.
(forthcoming 2007).
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generous retention bonuses to second-rate managers-that
are costly and contrary to the spirit and letter of the law. In
their effort to attract cases, bankruptcy judges fail to
enforce the law. The desire to attract business has, to use
LoPucki's word, "corrupted" the bankruptcy courts.
The link LoPucki draws between recidivism and
competition lies at the heart of LoPucki's empirical claim
that bankruptcy judges have gone astray. He claims that
his data show that modern reorganization practice is the
product of a destructive race to the bottom. The desire for
interesting cases leads to bad judging, and recidivism is one
of the consequences. Such is LoPucki's hypothesis.
Drawing inferences from statistics is a tricky business.
Anyone who closely examines LoPucki's data will find that
his basic recidivism result is unassailable. There is no
question that the recidivism rate in Delaware in the early
1990s was higher, much higher, than elsewhere. But
connecting the recidivism rate to a destructive race to the
bottom is quite a different matter.
In the first half of this Article, which will focus on
LoPucki's work, we make a narrow and largely
methodological point.6 LoPucki's data do not support the
race to the bottom hypothesis. This hypothesis may be
correct. Much evidence suggests that there has been
competition for cases.7  Some modern reorganization
practices are surely objectionable. And the competition may
have led to these objectionable practices. But LoPucki's
data do not prove that the two are connected.
6. The first half of this paper is a prdcis of a longer and more detailed
examination of LoPucki's work that one of us has made elsewhere. See Robert
K. Rasmussen, Empirically Bankrupt (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ.
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-07, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=895547.
7. While commentators disagree over the extent to which judges alter their
behavior to attract cases, there is wide agreement that at least some judges
take at least some actions that have the effect of making their courts more
attractive to those filing large cases. See, e.g., Marcus Cole, "Delaware is Not a
State Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1845, 1874-76 (2002); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas,
Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1357, 1369 (2000).
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The problem stems from a limitation built into the
methodology that LoPucki uses. Statistical techniques-
comparing different rates in different places over different
times--only work when the number of objects under study
is large enough. The more data points, the more one can
exclude competing hypotheses and the more robust the
finding. But when there are few data points, one cannot
exclude competing hypotheses. If we are mathematicians
and all we know is the location of a single point on a curve,
we can say nothing about the curve's slope. If we have only
two points, we can say something about the slope of the
curve, but we still cannot distinguish the curve from a
straight line. In the social sciences, it is the same way.
Regression analysis allows us to understand the forces
at work only if we have enough data. Statistics can be
suggestive. The finding of an extraordinarily high rate of
recidivism in Delaware in the early 1990s cries out for
further investigation. But when the number of cases is
small, case studies become the methodology of choice, not
regression analysis. Regression analysis can take us to base
camp but no further. Understanding what was going on in
Delaware and elsewhere during the early 1990s and later
requires delving into the facts of each case and trying to
make sense of them. Only by doing this can one make sense
of what was going on in Delaware.
We do not undertake the ambitious project of
understanding what happened in Delaware in the early
1990s in this short Article.8 Instead, we attempt to take
stock of what we know and how we should move forward.
First, in Part I, we show that there were simply not enough
cases in Delaware during the relevant time period to allow
us to draw firm conclusions. Delaware practices may have
triggered a race to the bottom, but the data do not show it.
Indeed, with respect to the cases of most interest, 9 the
differences in the recidivism rates (both between Delaware
and elsewhere in the early 1990s and between those filed
8. Again, one of us has pursued this question elsewhere. See Rasmussen &
Thomas, supra note 7.
9. For reasons we explain below, the cases central to the race to the bottom
debate are the ones that are neither prepackaged nor prenegotiated.
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elsewhere early on and those filed later) are not even
statistically significant. 10
In Part II, we argue that a debate over whether there
has been a race to the bottom misses a more fundamental
point. The modern reorganization case is hard to reconcile
with the prevailing justifications for having Chapter 11 in
the first place. The standard claim is that Chapter 11
serves to protect the value that businesses have as going-
concerns. In modern Chapter 11 cases, however, there is
typically very little going-concern value. Given that few of
the businesses are worth saving, one needs to search for
some other rationale for Chapter 11. To return again to
LoPucki, he proposes many reforms, but fails to offer an
adequate account of the purpose the system, as reformed,
would serve.
I. STATISTICS AND RECIDIVISM
Nearly 40% of the Chapter 11 cases filed in Delaware in
the early 1990s later reentered bankruptcy." By contrast,
outside of Delaware and the Southern District of New York,
the rate is only 5%.12 Prepackaged bankruptcies are the
most striking. Half of Delaware's large cases during this
time were prepacks, and half of them filed again. Prepacks
constituted a seventh of the docket elsewhere, but not a
single one filed elsewhere ended up refiling. 13 Despite this
stark difference in outcomes, Delaware increased its share
of prepackaged cases after 1996 to almost 80%. 14 Indeed,
while the number of prepackaged cases in total declined by
a third in the seven years after 1996 as compared with the
preceding seven years, Delaware actually received more
10. The differences in the recidivism rates between Delaware and elsewhere
are statistically significant at the 5% level only with respect to prepackaged
cases, not with respect to either the prenegotiated cases or the ones that were
neither prepackaged nor prenegotiated. We are not suggesting that there was
no recidivism problem in these cases, only that, because of the small sample
size, the result is less striking that it appears and the inferences one can
reasonably draw are necessarily limited.
11. See Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 59.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 60.
14. See id. at 61.
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prepackaged cases in the later period. The decline in
prepacks has been at the expense of the other jurisdictions.
Understanding why the prepackaged plans failed in
Delaware, but not elsewhere, is an interesting question, as
is the question of why Delaware today has a near monopoly
on these cases. Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the
stakes. The failure of prepackaged plans in Delaware does
not seem to have been at the expense of the
unsophisticated. Most companies that file prepacks were
failed leveraged buyouts or had otherwise taken on large
amounts of high yield debt. 15 Carl Icahn and other
professional investors held the affected debt. 16 Trade debt
and the other ordinary obligations of the business were
typically left unimpaired. A more aggressive restructuring
that converted more of the debt into equity would have
saved time and money, but those in control of the
reorganization and others like them were the ones that bore
the brunt of the cost. 17
More to the point, the recidivism of prepackaged plans
in Delaware is hard to connect with LoPucki's corruption
story. Delaware judges may have handled these cases badly
and may continue to handle such cases badly (a question we
do not confront here). It is even possible that judges
elsewhere would have replicated the same errors if given
the chance. But they were not. Prepacks virtually
disappeared outside of Delaware. Since 1996, only three
courts other than Delaware have seen prepackaged cases,
with only the Southern District of New York attracting
more than two. There is no evidence that the judges
elsewhere sought prepackaged cases, and LoPucki's
competition story suggests they would not. Judges do not
compete to become rubber stamps. 18 The problems with
15. See id. at 72-73.
16. Id. at 75.
17. Gilson suggests that creditors may find it in their interest to keep
substantial leverage in a reorganized company so as to keep pressure on
managers to improve results. See Stuart C. Gilson, Transaction Costs and
Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J.
FIN. 161, 182-83 (1997).
18. LoPucki describes the temptation that "corrupts" the bankruptcy judge
in the following way:
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prepackaged plans in Delaware, whatever they may have
been, did not spread elsewhere, and it is not the focus of
LoPucki's story.
Prepackaged plans have a dynamic that is different
from other cases. Hence, combining prepacks with other
types of cases in Delaware is suspect. The apples and
apples comparison is between the same types of cases
across different jurisdictions and different times. There are,
in addition to prepackaged cases, two other types. The first
is the prenegotiated plan. During the early 1990s,
prenegotiated plans were both a substitute for prepackaged
cases and were comparatively rare. There were also only
five prenegotiated plans outside of Delaware and none
failed. 19 There is a difference in the recidivism rate of
course (20% versus 0%), but the difference is not
statistically significant. 20 To establish a race to the bottom,
we should focus on the comparison involving the cases that
were neither prepackaged nor prenegotiated. It is in these
types of cases, the Enrons, Polaroids, and Kmarts, where
LoPucki says that the judges' heads have been turned.
LoPucki's empirical claim rests on two comparisons.
First is the comparison between the recidivism rate in
Delaware and the rate in other jurisdictions in the early
[The bankruptcy judge becomes] the most powerful person in the
room. Millions and sometimes even billions of dollars turn on his
or her decision. The status that power confers extends beyond the
courtroom.
Celebrity comes along with the power. The judges' decisions are
reported in the media. Judges in the biggest cases have standing
invitations from professional organizations to travel to resort cities
... to give speeches and be honored. If they return to law practice
... clients with big cases will seek them out.
See LoPucKi, supra note 4, at 20. Very few of these benefits accrue to a judge
who oversees a prepackaged bankruptcy for a month. One might argue that a
bankruptcy judge that refused to "play ball" in a prepackaged case would earn a
reputation as a "toxic judge," but bankruptcy judges outside of New York and
Delaware during the period in which LoPucki claims they had become
"corrupted" never had a chance to show whether they would or not.
19. See Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 59.
20. If we combine prepackaged and prenegotiated cases, Delaware's refiling
rate for this grouping of cases is 42% and that of other courts is 0%.
2006] 349
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1990s. 21 Second is the comparison between this recidivism
rate in the other jurisdictions during this period and the
rate in these same jurisdictions subsequently. The
comparisons are consistent with LoPucki's story. During
the early 1990s, Delaware had a recidivism rate of 33%
compared with a rate of 8% elsewhere. Moreover, the
recidivism rate elsewhere jumped from 8% to nearly 20%
after 1996. This is the evidence that LoPucki has to support
his empirical claim of destructive competition. Delaware's
judges had lax practices that led to higher rates of
recidivism. When these practices are mimicked, a higher
recidivism rate follows.
But these two comparisons standing on their own do
not prove destructive competition. To be sure, there was a
higher recidivism rate in Delaware than elsewhere in the
early 1990s and the recidivism rate outside of Delaware
increased after 1996 relative to what it was before. 22
Destructive competition is one hypothesis, but many other
forces were at work that might have produced these results.
To interpret the data, we must control for the factors that
have nothing to do with the race to the bottom story. For
example, businesses in particular industries might have
been more inclined to file in Delaware and these might have
been industries in which the Chapter 11 failure rate is
unusually high. Chapter 11 has never had much success
with legacy airlines. No airline from the era before
deregulation has ever filed for Chapter 11 and emerged
successfully. All but Continental Airlines failed, and
Continental needed two trips to the bankruptcy court to
right itself.23 If Delaware had a disproportionate number of
airline cases, this might explain the higher rate.
There are other things for which we want to control as
well. LoPucki's story is about making the forum attractive
for case placers. Hence, we need to control for filings where
the filer is someone other than the typical case placer. In
the early 1990s, LoPucki asserts, the case placers were
managers and their professionals. Hence, we should exclude
cases where they did not control the filing. We cannot do
21. Following LoPucki, we are looking at cases filed after 1989 that emerged
before 1997.
22. See Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 52.
23. See id. at 69.
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this perfectly, but we can at least control for involuntary
cases. We cannot tell why the creditors might have been
filed in such a court, but we can be confident that it was not
because the court was looking for their business.
In addition, we want to make sure that we identified
the relevant populations correctly. By LoPucki's account,
Delaware became a magnet for large cases with the filing of
Continental. Hence, if we can, we would like to control for
cases filed before Continental. We also want to make sure
that the second filing was a result of the first filing and not
some event that came along later. LoPucki does this by
drawing a sharp line at five years. Anyone who files again
within five years is assumed to be filing because the first
Chapter 11 failed. Anyone who files after five years is
assumed to be filing for some other reason. LoPucki's test is
a reasonable way to account for the possibility that the
second Chapter 11 arose for independent reasons.
Nevertheless, we want to make sure that any result is not
an artifact of drawing the line at five years rather than at
four or six.
Making such adjustments is a standard part of
regression analysis. The problem we confront, however, is
that we simply do not have enough cases to make these
adjustments and still have any hope of being able to rely on
statistical inference alone. Indeed, the sample size is so
small that the differences are not very compelling even on
their own terms. They hover at the very edge of statistical
significance. 24 LoPucki faces an insuperable challenge given
the technique he is using. The small number of cases puts a
limit on what can be done with statistics alone. The results
are extremely sensitive to small changes in sample
selection.
24. The difference between the cases that were neither prepackaged nor
prenegotiated is not statistically significant at the 5% level after using a
continuity correction, something ordinarily done when the sample size, as here,
is small. If one excludes only prepackaged bankruptcies (combining
prenegotiated and traditional reorganizations), the difference does become
statistically significant at the 5% level. Again, none of this is surprising given
the small sample size. It does suggest that something is going on outside the
prepackaged cases. Moreover, the results as a whole show a statistically
significant difference between Delaware and other jurisdictions, even
controlling for prepacks. Something important is going on, but we do not have
enough data to tell what it is.
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To see the problem, if we reduce the window for
recidivism from five years to four, the recidivism rate in
Delaware drops by two thirds. At this level, Delaware
cannot be differentiated statistically from other courts.
Indeed, the performance of Delaware under this
specification is identical to that of the Central District of
California. If we put pre-Continental cases, involuntary
petitions, and airline cases to one side, recidivism in
Delaware disappears. We do not mean that the difference
becomes statistically insignificant. We mean that
recidivism disappears completely. No large Chapter 1is file
again. Excluding prepackaged and prenegotiated cases,
only one large voluntary Chapter 11 that filed after
Continental in Delaware failed during the relevant time
period, and it was TWA, an airline case.
Put prepackaged and prenegotiated plans to one side,
and LoPucki's Delaware recidivism result turns on three
cases. 25 Three cases (out of nine in all) are simply not
enough to allow the inference of competition or corruption.
Three points are scarcely enough to tell us much about the
shape of a curve. There is a similar problem with the
comparison between cases filed outside of Delaware before
1996 and afterwards. There are four recidivists out of the
eighteen companies that emerged. This difference is not
statistically significant either. 26
The recidivism rate between Delaware and elsewhere is
statistically significant if we combine prenegotiated plans
with those that were neither prepackaged nor
prenegotiated. But we need to explain why the two types of
cases belong together. Even then, the result involves only
four cases and still hovers at the edge of significance. The
result is statistically significant only if we draw the line for
refilers at five years. If we drew the line at any other
place-one year, two years, three years, four years, or six
years-the difference in recidivism rates ceases to be
statistically significant. 27
25. See Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 63.
26. This difference remains even if we include prenegotiated plans.
27. Moreover, combining the prenegotiated cases with those that are not
either prepacks or prenegotiated is not enough to establish statistical
significance in comparing the recidivism rate outside of Delaware and New
York before 1996 and after. One can establish statistical significance if one
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We do not, however, want to argue about statistical
significance. Social scientists are too easily hung up on the
accident of statistical significance, and in any event
LoPucki has found enough connections in enough places to
suggest that, whether statistically significant or not,
something was going on in Delaware that was different.
The problem rather lies in our inability to draw many
inferences from the data.
LoPucki analogizes his findings to the connection
between smoking and lung cancer. He does not identify
cases in which competition led to a loss of jobs or the
destruction of a business, but he infers it from the
statistical pattern, just as we can infer that smoking leads
to lung cancer even if we do not know whether a particular
person got lung cancer as a result of smoking. LoPucki,
however, does not recognize the crucial difference between
his study and those on smoking and lung cancer. We know
that smoking causes lung cancer only because we are able
to control for the many other variables that are at work.
Miners may smoke more than doctors, and miners may be
more likely to contract lung cancer, but we cannot infer
from this alone that smoking causes lung cancer. We have
to control for occupation (and much else). Only after we do
this and the correlation between smoking and lung cancer
still remains, can we draw the causal connection.
Another example illustrates what happens absent such
controls. Let us assume that you decide to study the life
expectancy of those who watched football on television.
Your initial result would be quite striking. You would
discover a strong inverse correlation between the two.
Regardless of whether they watch professional or college
football, whether it is on the weekend or on Monday night,
those who watch football tend to die sooner than the
population as a whole. Nor is the phenomenon connected
with television. Those who watch football on television tend
drops those cases in which the corporation that emerged from Chapter 11 was
private, but one needs some reason to do it here and not elsewhere. But we do
not think a debate over statistical significance with this or that measure is the
issue. LoPucki's results are suggestive, but they are also remarkably fragile.
They fall far short of what is needed to make the use of the word "corrupt"
appropriate.
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to live shorter lives than those who watch other
programming.
But you should not stop here. Before you can say
whether football watching shortens life expectancy, you
need to ask what else might be at work. Among other
things, you must account for the fact that many more men
than women watch football on television. Once you do this,
the effect disappears. Men watch more football on television
than women, and they have shorter life expectancies. The
connection between smoking and lung cancer is robust
precisely because the connection between smoking and lung
cancer remains even after variables such as gender,
ethnicity, socio-economic status, and occupation are taken
into account.
LoPucki cannot analogize his results to smoking and
lung cancer because he has not controlled for all the things
that might have led to higher rates of recidivism in
Delaware (and later elsewhere) other than judges aiming to
make case placers happy. The same factor (or combination
of factors) that led the company to file in Delaware might
have also led them to fail again. LoPucki is unable to
eliminate such possibilities, not because he is unwilling, but
because he lacks the data. The handful of traditional
reorganizations in LoPucki's sample is simply insufficient
to allow us to identify competition among the courts as the
cause of higher rates of recidivism.
None of this is to suggest that the judging in Delaware
in the early 1990s was admirable. Indeed, there is much to
suggest that it was not. 28 Nor is it to deny that what
happened in Delaware powerfully influenced practices
elsewhere. There is much to suggest that it did. Moreover,
one can argue (as LoPucki does so forcefully) that some
practices in large cases today are costly and objectionable.
But LoPucki's critique of current Chapter 11 practices must
stand or fall on its own. His empirical study of large
corporate Chapter 11s in the early 1990s, as valuable and
as important as it is, cannot be connected to modern
28. Some of the problems were set out in a report commissioned by the
Federal Judicial Center. See GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
CHAPTER 11 VENUE CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES: REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM (1997).
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bankruptcy practice using the methodology he employs.
Three data points are not enough.
II. MAKING THE CASE FOR CHAPTER 11
To offer a critique of modern bankruptcy practice, one
ought to have a coherent vision of what reorganization law
should be doing and measure existing practice in light of
that vision. To understand large, modern reorganizations,
one must know something about the businesses themselves,
not just the bankruptcy process. Before one begins a debate
over the appropriate treatment of asset sales, critical
vendor orders, key employee retention programs, or other
features of the modern Chapter 11 landscape, one must
have some theory of why we should have a reorganization
law at all. Scholars have neglected this task. More
specifically, they have not reconciled the vision of
reorganization law they offer with the types of cases in
Chapter 11.
Those who would defend some form of Chapter 11 are,
whether they know it or not, at a crucial crossroads. They
might defend Chapter 11 as an appropriate place to sell
large businesses or to bless non-bankruptcy workouts, but
they are not inclined to do this. They find fault with the
control now exercised by those who decide to place the
business in bankruptcy and do not think Chapter 11 exists
to serve the needs of senior lenders.29 But if they do not
want Chapter 11 to play this role, what role should it play?
This is a different and far more difficult challenge. The
comfortable homilies they have long relied upon simply no
longer work.
Any justification of Chapter 11 has to start with an
explanation of the purposes it serves. The easiest path is
29. See, e.g., George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 19, 24-25 (2004) ("secured creditors, capitalizing upon agency problems
to gain the help of insiders and insolvency professionals [have] effectively
take[n] over--or hijack[ed]-the Chapter 11 process and essentially created a
federal unified foreclosure process."); Stephen J. Lubben, The New and
Improved Chapter 11 (Seton Hall Pub. Law Working Paper No. 2, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=567321; Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y.
Waisman, The Creditor in Possession: Creditor Control of Chapter 11
Reorganization Cases, 21 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1, 2 (2003); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004).
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one that rationalizes the existing practice: Chapter 11 is a
useful place to sell assets and implement non-bankruptcy
workouts. In contrast to the 1980s, the majority of large
Chapter 11 cases today use the bankruptcy forum for
exactly this purpose. During the 1980s, nine out of ten large
businesses entering Chapter 11 began without a
prepackaged or prenegotiated plan and emerged as
operating companies. By 2002, it was less than one in four.
Going-concern sales in bankruptcy are now commonplace.
In 2002, 56% of all large Chapter lis resulted in going-
concern sales of one sort or another. Of those that
remained, 62% put in place a deal reached before the
bankruptcy began. Together, sales and workouts account
for 84% of the cases.30 LoPucki and others, however, want
Chapter 11 to do something else. But they need to tell us
what that is.
Virtually all justifications of Chapter 11 begin with
assertions to the effect that Chapter 11 is about preserving
businesses. It prevents valuable assets from being sold for
scrap, saves jobs, and maintains valuable relationships
between the business and the rest of the world. Chapter 11
can fix the business and return it to financial health. 31
Specialized assets are kept in their highest valued use, jobs
are saved, and relationships are preserved. Stated or not,
the assumption is always that businesses in Chapter 11
have value that is at risk of being lost. It is exactly this
assumption that needs to be explored. Mere hand-waving
and assertions that Chapter 11 can save businesses,
preserve relationships, and protect jobs are insufficient. The
stakes here are much larger than the Delaware recidivism
debate.
In our view, the standard justifications for Chapter 11
stumble at the very beginning.32 Our economy is now one in
30. We set out these statistics at much greater length in Douglas G. Baird &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675-77
(2003).
31. LoPucki, for example, asserts that, "bankruptcy allows the company to
keep what is good about its business and shed the rest. Most companies can be
rescued simply by getting rid of the bad businesses and product lines and
keeping the rest. LOPUCKI, supra note 4, at 116.
32. As we set out at length elsewhere, we think there are two other
obstacles in addition to an absence of going-concern value, which is our focus
here. The traditional account of corporate reorganizations also assumes that the
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which the financially distressed business in Chapter 11
rarely has much value as a going-concern. We can illustrate
with a few examples. In December 2002, the bankruptcy
court in Delaware confirmed Global Crossing's plan of
reorganization. 33 One of the largest corporations ever to go
through Chapter 11, Global Crossing is emblematic of
Chapter 1l's past and its future. Global Crossing was
formed in 1997 to close one of the last gaps in the Internet.
The telecommunications cables connecting the continents
were too small to accommodate the expected growth in the
Internet use outside of North America. In 1997, those
outside North America accounted for only 20% of the
Internet use; by 2000, they would account for almost half.3 4
To take advantage of this change, Global Crossing laid
a trans-Atlantic cable within ten months and embarked on
ambitious plans to create a global, fiber optic network. It
reached one billion in revenues within its first twenty
months. Global Crossing continued to invest billions in
creating the first network of fiber optic cable across the
world's oceans. Global Crossing's fall, however, was as swift
as its rise. Competitors appeared. Internet traffic grew, but
not at the rate expected. Moreover, technological innovation
allowed much more information to be carried over the same
cable. As a result, there was massive overcapacity in the
industry. Global Crossing's revenues barely paid its ongoing
expenses, and its stock price collapsed. 35
investors in a financially distressed business cannot sort out the financial
distress through ordinary bargaining (and instead require Chapter l1's
collective forum) and that the business cannot be readily sold in the market as
a going concern. As with going-concern value, remove any one of these
conditions, and the standard account of corporate reorganization law fails. It is
hard to find any one of these three conditions (going-concern value, inability to
bargain, or inability to sell as a going-concern) in a financially distressed
business today, and it is exceedingly unlikely that all three of them will exist at
the same time. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 30.
33. See Ron Orol, FCC Approves Global Crossing Sale, DAILY DEAL, Oct. 10,
2003.
34. For an account of Global Crossing's rise, see GEORGE GILDER, TELECOSM:
THE WORLD AFTER BANDWIDTH ABUNDANCE 183-90 (2000).
35. Reinhardt Krause, More Worries Surface About Global Crossing After
Canceled Merger, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 13, 2001, at A8.
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Compare this situation to that of the nineteenth
century railroad, the paradigm for the traditional corporate
reorganization. There, even if the revenues are not enough
to pay the creditors in full, everyone is better off if the iron
rails and wooden ties are kept together rather than sold for
scrap. Investors did better by keeping the business intact.
Fiber optic cable might seem to the 1990s what iron rails
and wooden ties were to the 1880s. A promising technology
will bring people together as never before. Closer
examination, however, reveals fundamental differences
between nineteenth century railroads on the one hand and
Global Crossing and the many casualties of the dot com era
on the other.
Of the differences that matter, the most telling is the
absence of going-concern value. In Global Crossing, the
value of keeping the assets together is not self-evident.
Global Crossing has to compete in a market in which
networks can be formed easily through contract. As long as
these contracting costs are low (and they are), Global
Crossing's ability to offer direct connections between Tokyo
and London is not worth much. A pulse of light can be
transferred between multiple carriers much more easily
than rail freight. A detour of thousands of miles is
irrelevant. A route that is twice as long matters if one is
moving coal or wheat, but not if one is moving electrons.
The value of what is being preserved by keeping a business
like Global Crossing intact is much smaller than in the case
of railroads.
Iridium provides a different example of an absence of
going-concern value. 36 One of the largest business failures
in history, Iridium built a five billion dollar network of
satellites in low-earth orbit. The business plan was based
on the idea that this network could capture 1% of the world
market for cellular phones. At least this many users of
cellular phones would pay a premium for a phone that
would work anywhere on the globe. The business idea
required a large investment in dedicated assets with a long
development time. By the time the network came into
36. For information about Iridium, its history, and its bankruptcy
proceedings, see David Barboza, Iridium, Bankrupt, Is Planning a Fiery Ending
for Its 88 Satellites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2000, at Cl; Jonathan Sidener, Grand
Telecommunications Scheme Set in Motion, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Mar. 26, 2000, at
D1; Peter Spiegel, Dishing Out Data, FORBES, Jan. 24, 2000, at 110.
358 [Vol. 54
BEYOND RECIDIVISM
operation, however, cellular phone technology had
outstripped it in both convenience and costs. Few people
were far enough away from ordinary phone service that
they wanted to spend several dollars a minute for a brick-
sized Iridium phone that could be used only outdoors. Once
Iridium's business plan failed, its dedicated assets had little
value. The judge came close to ordering that the satellites
be destroyed because the cost of maintaining them in orbit
was too high relative to the revenues they were generating.
There was no value for Chapter 11 to preserve. 37
Many giant corporations in Chapter 11 lack large
infrastructure investments altogether. To focus again on
cases that emerged in 2002, some, such as Chiquita Brands
and NTL, were holding companies. Their operating
subsidiaries were not in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 provides a
relatively cheap way to put a new capital structure in place,
but the value being preserved is only that of the holding
company. The only thing that would happen in the absence
of a reorganization would be for the equity of the operating
companies to be spread among diverse creditors. There
might be something lost here, but it cannot be much.
In many other large Chapter 1 is, particularly those in
which there was neither a prenegotiated plan nor an asset
sale, the corporation is a collection of discrete businesses,
such as movie theaters (Carmike Cinema), nursing homes
(Sun HeathCare, Carematrix, and Mariner Post-Acute
Network), or hotels (Lodgian). What is at risk is the synergy
gained from putting these different discrete businesses
under one umbrella. This synergy itself, however, is often of
recent vintage. The business itself was formed through the
same highly leveraged acquisitions that precipitated the
financial distress and the need to reorganize.
Unlike a railroad, the synergy that many Chapter 11
businesses possess is intangible and often quite small.
Many assets work equally as well in one business as in
37. As with many other large firms in Chapter 11, Iridium's assets were
ultimately sold to a newly formed entity, in this case for $25 million. See
Jonathan Sidener, Deal Resurrects Iridium System, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 16,
2000, at D1. Its principal customer was the military. Ocean drilling platforms
and other remote industrial users constituted the remainder of the customer
base. See Yuki Noguchi, Iridium Finds Itself in a Contractual Bind, WASH.
POST, May 23, 2002, at E5.
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another. Indeed, assets that are tailored to a specific firm
may not represent a source of value but the source of
failure. Neither the size of a business such as Global
Crossing, nor the value of its assets, nor the number of
people employed under the corporate umbrella suggests
that it possesses the going-concern value on which the
standard account of Chapter 11 rests.
As communication costs, transportation costs, and
contracting costs drop, it has become easier to produce
goods without creating a traditional business--or for there
to be great value in preserving an existing one. The ability
to outsource has left even large-scale manufacturers less
dependent on having their own plant and equipment. More
than a third of Boeing's latest airplanes are being made in
Japan.38 Human capital today is increasingly industry-
specific, rather than business-specific. Even in the most
high-tech sector of the economy, the place where the skills
of the workers tend to loom largest, we see high levels of
worker mobility. 39 Worker mobility again has increased
over the last several decades, and workers are now more
mobile because the skills they acquire at one business are
readily transferable to another in the same industry.40
There are, to be sure, some potential sources of going-
concern value. Large businesses have thousands of
employees. Each employee has multiple relationships with
each other and with the business's many suppliers and
customers. This vast web of relationships constitutes the
firm. Large investments were required to bring it into being
and investments on a similar scale would be needed to
replicate it. The idea of value flowing from relationships fits
with the conception of the firm that Ronald Coase
established long ago. A "firm," as Coase understands it,
consists of the "system of relationships which comes into
existence when the direction of resources is dependent on
38. See Peter Pae, Japanese Helping 787 Take Wing, L.A. TIMES, May 9,
2005, at C1.
39. See generally STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG, JOHN A. ALIC & HOWARD WIAL,
NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY: EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN
POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 30 (1998).
40. While Key Employee Retention Programs (KERPs) undoubtedly contain
the potential for abuse, in their least objectionable form they are a recognition
of this basic reality.
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an entrepreneur."4 1 Instead of the price mechanism
directing the flow of resources, an entrepreneur takes
command of them. The relationships, not the assets, are the
firm.
But saying this does not tell us that businesses based
on such relationships have substantial going-concern value.
To make the case that a business has substantial value as a
going-concern by virtue of its relationships, one must
establish both that the business's relationships are costly to
replicate and that the business is itself sound. Neither is
likely to be true for the large businesses that find
themselves in Chapter 11.
Relationships may be relatively inexpensive to put in
place. Nothing about Coase's theory of the firm requires
that the relationships that constitute the firm be costly to
create or replicate. Indeed, Coase's theory only tells us
about relative costs. Transactions take place in a
corporation only when the outside alternative is more
expensive. As transaction costs outside the firm go down,
the upper bound on the value of relationships inside the
firm goes down as well, exerting downward pressure on the
firm's value as a going-concern. Far from supporting a
traditional view of reorganization, Coase tells us the
opposite.
Pillowtex offers a telling example. 42 Pillowtex was the
manufacturer of Cannon and Royal Velvet towels and
Fieldcrest sheets and pillows. It cost millions to build the
factories, hire thousands of employees, and create all the
relationships that made Pillowtex's business work, but the
corporation has no value as a going-concern in a world in
which the towels, pillows, and sheets can be made under
the same labels for less off-shore.
Pillowtex is a Chapter 11 recidivist, but one that can
give no comfort to those who support a traditional view of
Chapter 11. To be sure, its first Chapter 11 was a two-year
long effort to mediate the relationships among employees,
41. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, in THE NATURE OF
THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 22 (Oliver E. Williamson &
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993).
42. For a more detailed discussion, see Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 30,
at 683-84.0
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suppliers, and others. It brought together diverse interests,
and a plan emerged that gave the business its best chance
going forward. But forces were at work that the best
intentioned cannot stop. In the end, there was nothing
bankruptcy could do to save Pillowtex. The value it once
had as a going-concern was gone. For better or for worse,
the role that Chapter 11 can play in today's economy has
little or nothing to do with reorganizing railroads or saving
factories in small towns.
All of this suggests that we should look at bankruptcy
cases through a different empirical lens. Pillowtex was a
recidivist, but, more importantly for someone who wants to
justify Chapter 11, it was a business without value as a
going-concern. Quite apart from whether the second
Chapter 11 was necessary, we have to ask about the first.
The problem here runs deep. Consider, for example, two
of the Delaware recidivists LoPucki identifies-Cherokee
and Ithaca Industries. Both were in the clothing business,
both filed prepackaged plans in Delaware in the 1990s, and
both returned to Chapter 11. But it is a mistake to end the
story there. Cherokee is still around, but in a radically
different form, one that is inconsistent with it having much
going-concern value. It closed down its wholesale
manufacturing and distribution operations, dismissed its
work force, and focused exclusively on licensing its
trademarks. Its licensees do their own sourcing. Its sole
source of revenue is the "Cherokee" brand name. The
corporation still exists but it is a fundamentally different
business.
Ithaca Industries was, from the perspective of
traditional bankruptcy scholarship, virtually identical to
Cherokee. It, however, lacked a brand name for which
consumers were willing to pay. The corporation failed
completely. Perhaps these two prepackaged bankruptcies
should have been done differently, but in neither case could
Chapter 11 preserve going-concern value. There was not
any.
CONCLUSION
The difficulty of finding going-concern value is a
challenge that bankruptcy scholars have neglected, even
those whose work has an empirical focus. It points in an
uncomfortable direction. It is possible to embrace existing
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Chapter 11 practice on the ground that it has reinvented
itself. Overseeing asset sales and allowing those who own
the business to quickly reorganize may be good things for
bankruptcy judges to do. Effective oversight from the
appellate courts can check abuses such as critical vendor
orders get out of hand.43 But if one wants to reject current
practice, one has to face hard questions about just what
purpose Chapter 11 is serving and those questions must
take into account the realities of today's economy, one in
which there are vanishingly few railroads.
43. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
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